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Abstract 
This paper argues that the ‘structurational tradition’ within interpretive information 
systems has revealed some useful aspects of the organizational implementation and 
use of ICT, but that usually this has been achieved at the expense of an intuitively 
convincing account of human motivation.  Although Giddens’ ‘dimensions of the 
duality of structure’ is an important aspect of his thought, many IS studies have 
tended to focus almost exclusively on this model, in isolation from the broader canvas 
of his ideas.  It is argued that such an approach offers an unbalanced and incomplete 
view of social interaction, which reflects neither organizational realities, nor 
Giddens’ wider theoretical position.  In response, the paper resituates the 
structurational model within the broader context of Giddens’ work, offering 
researchers a practical framework with which to further sensitise their analyses to 
actors’ more biographical motivations.  The explanatory power of this framework is 
illustrated with reference to the author’s own biographical experience as an IS 
consultant working for a major systems integrator in the early 1990s. 
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1. Introduction 
Giddens’ sociological thought has become an increasingly common component 
of IS research, applied with varying degrees of literalness to interpret empirical 
material (Jones, 1999).  This paper argues that, whilst the application of his ideas has 
borne considerable fruit within the IS domain, there has been a tendency within IS 
and organizational studies to take and use his ‘dynamics of the duality of structure’ 
(Giddens, 1984:29) narrowly, out of the context from which it derives its significance 
and wider coherence.  The argument builds on a similar contention (e.g. Whittington, 
1992) in relation to a perceived neglect by structurational studies of Giddens’ equal 
attention to peoples’ active negotiation of the intersections and tensions between the 
different social communities in which they participate.  However, this paper proposes 
that there is an additional, serious omission, of particular importance to IS studies: 
Giddens’ emphasis on the centrality of human motive, so pivotal to his writings – and, 
indeed, to the growing literature addressing the link between artefacts, organizational 
culture and employee identification (e.g. Barker, 1998). 
The paper therefore seeks to develop a case for a greater incorporation of this 
broader, and fundamental, aspect of Giddens’ thought within IS studies seeking to 
apply his structurational framework, as follows.  The first section presents an 
overview of the arguably pivotal importance of biographical narrative throughout 
Giddens’ work, of which it is argued that his structurational model per se is not 
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sufficiently representative to be used on a standalone basis as the sole theoretical 
foundation for a piece of IS research.  The second section then develops a practical 
framework to complement Giddens’ structurational model, intended to assist IS 
researchers to address this perceived ‘skewedness’, by factoring in considerations of 
these wider components of Giddens’ thought, resulting in a more balanced analysis 
which is more representative of his ideas.  In the third section, I draw upon my own 
biographical experience to provide an illustration of the sort of additional insights and 
sensitivities available to researchers who include this framework within their 
analyses.  Finally, the paper concludes by addressing some limitations and 
implications of the framework. 
 
2. The pivotal role of motive in Giddens’ work 
It is arguable that a keen attention to the importance of peoples’ motives for 
behaving in the way that they do runs throughout the broad canvas of Giddens’ 
thought, and indeed, endows it with much of its integrated character.  Underlying his 
ideas is his treatment of the deeply embedded dualism within the social sciences 
between objectivism and subjectivism – the extent to which the social object of study 
should be ‘society’, as opposed to the individual.  An awareness of this dualism – and 
the ‘duality’ which he proposes for its resolution - runs throughout Giddens’ work, 
underlying several of his key ideas.  Perhaps the most fundamental form occurs in The 
Constitution of Society (1984), where Giddens reinterprets Max Weber’s 
verstehen/erklaren (understanding/explanation) dichotomy, proposing, in the ‘double 
hermeneutic’, the impossibility within social science of keeping the conceptual 
apparatus of the observer free from involvement in the situation being studied.  In 
circulating in and out of the social world, a person’s thoughts are deeply linked to 
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wider social structures – an observation responsible for the theory (like activity 
‘theory’, and actor network ‘theory’, also really an ontology) of structuration, which 
describes the process whereby the ‘absent totality’ of social context is continually 
drawn upon and reconstituted in social interaction.   
The important point to be made immediately upon presentation of this basic 
foundation is that this ‘duality’, and hence the majority of Giddens’ thought, is built 
upon a particular understanding about the centrality of individual motive in social 
production and reproduction, and hence of the realm of individual interpretation and 
action, wherein this duality is played out.  Giddens achieves this understanding by 
developing Bourdieu’s habitus to place more emphasis on the primacy of the 
individual as knowledge agent, which allows him to redress the 
structuralist/poststructuralist decentring of the subject within structuralist linguistics.  
Indeed, in The New Rules of Sociological Method, he places peoples’ interpretive 
activity at the centre of his analysis, citing it as a key differentiator of his ideas in 
relation to structuralism, which 
 
“bears the limitations of its origins in its inability to confront issues of the 
genesis and temporality of meaning” (1976:126). 
 
In contrast, meaning is central for Giddens, who is influenced by Goffman’s 
thought on the interaction between the conscious and unconscious in the individual, 
and the role this plays in the way in which they make sense of the world.  Indeed, 
Goffman’s ‘frame analysis’ has helped to structure Giddens’ understanding of the 
micro-level interactions between individuals, and between individuals and wider 
society – and, significantly, to address the relationship between the two.  However, in 
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his consideration of the agency/structure divide, Giddens differs from Goffman in 
blurring the line between front and back regions (1984), and distinguishing between 
three types of consciousness: ‘discursive consciousness’, ‘practical consciousness’, 
and the ‘unconscious’ (in the Freudian sense).  Of these, practical consciousness (as a 
rational, if ‘unaware’, response) is the most significant, since it mediates between the 
agency/structure divide and the conscious/unconscious divide. 
Giddens’ structurational dynamic integrates the above concepts into an approach 
to the study of social interaction.  In their everyday encounters of ‘co-presence’, 
Giddens argues (following Wittgenstein) that individuals both follow and re-create 
social rules.  Since the ‘absent totality’ of social rules necessarily frames, conditions, 
and mediates social interaction, the process whereby (like any ideology) motivated 
people succeed in reflecting their interests within such rules within an organization is 
shaped by differences in power and resources at their disposal – both in terms of 
material resources and (after Bourdieu) cultural ‘capital’ (which might be termed as a 
collection of acquired social skills which reinforce the individual’s ability to meet 
expectations within social contexts).  Once organizational inequalities have been 
formed (although these are clearly not static in nature), Giddens argues that 
institutions employ ‘surveillance’ techniques in attempts to extend and maintain the 
existing status quo (1984).  Giddens conceives of surveillance as taking many forms, 
from the extension of control over time-space through clock-time, to the future (for 
example, legislation, commodity speculation), to simple organizational hierarchies. 
In offering a conceptual tool with which to look for “connections between 
legitimation and domination in the constitution of societies” (1981:65), Giddens 
encourages the researcher to seek such connections in the interaction between 
consciously and unconsciously motivated, ‘purposive, reasoning behaviour’, and 
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social constraint/enablement.  It is thus fitting that the following passage is to be 
found in, of all his works, The Constitution of Society: 
 
“The actors have ‘good reasons’ for what they do, reasons which the structural 
sociologist is likely to assume implicitly rather than explicitly attributing to 
those actors…all explanations will involve at least implicit reference both to the 
purposive, reasoning behaviour of agents and to its intersection within 
constraining and enabling features of the social and material contexts of that 
behaviour” (1984:178-9). 
 
The position of individual motive as the driving logic behind social production 
and reproduction is especially visible in The Consequences of Modernity, which 
centres on the individual’s experience of modernity, rather than ‘modernity’ itself.  
Thus characteristics of modernity such as time-space separation, disembedding 
mechanisms, and reflexive appropriation of knowledge, are all emergent properties 
linked to the individual’s perceived risk, and capacity for trust, in relation to his or her 
attempts to moderate an irreducibly personal experience of modernity and maintain 
ontological security. 
In turn, Giddens proposes that such attempts are only explainable in relation to 
their “reflexive constitution of self-identity” (1991:86) within the narrative of a 
perceived trajectory of the self.  Drawing on Heidegger and the time-geographer 
Hagerstrand, he proposes that there is an inherently temporal character to human 
existence - the “temporality of meaning” alluded to earlier.  Such a position entails a 
distinction between three types of temporality, “of very considerable 
importance”(Giddens, 1984:36):  
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“Daily life has a duration, a flow, but it does not lead anywhere; the very 
adjective ‘day-to-day’ and its synonyms indicate that time here is constituted 
only in repetition. The life of the individual, by contrast, is not only finite but 
irreversible, ‘being towards death’.  ‘This is death, to die and know 
it’”(1984:35). 
 
These two types of experienced temporality – reversible and irreversible - 
intersect with each other, and with “the ‘supra-individual’ durée of the long-term 
existence of institutions, the longue durée of institutional time” (1984:35) – like daily 
life, another reversible dimension.  Crucially for the thrust of this discussion: 
 
“Theorizing the self means formulating a conception of motivation (or so I shall 
argue) and relating motivation to the connections between unconscious and 
conscious qualities of the agent.  The self cannot be understood outside ‘history’ 
– ‘history’ meaning in this case the temporality of human practices, expressed in 
the mutual interpolation of the three dimensions I have described” (1984:36). 
 
Although Giddens’ works can appear at times to resemble the Bible, in the way 
in which it is usually possible to find a passage supporting (out of context) whatever 
standpoint one wishes to adopt, it is arguable that the above statement is consistent 
with a view throughout his work that the constitution of society through the intentions 
and practices of people is closely related to dimensions of time-space – the 
“temporality of meaning” - in particular, the non-reversible dimension.  This is 
because the irreversible temporality of the human agent’s bodily involvement – their 
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lifespan – and thus the desire for a coherent narrative trajectory which stems from this 
– comes to infuse the more empirically ‘visible’ and reversible dimensions of daily 
interaction, and of organizational existence.  Although invisible, the individual’s 
irreversible condition of “being towards death” – and, crucially, “knowing it” - thus 
affects both of the visible, reversible, dimensions, by infusing his or her motivations 
within day-to-day social interaction, which come over time to condition wider 
structures at the institutional level.  It is thus no exaggeration to say that an awareness 
of the irreversible dimension in time-space interaction must be a prerequisite to 
making sense of Giddens’ ideas, since this underlies his conception of motivation – of 
human experience itself - and thus underpins his view of social production and 
reproduction in the manner explained earlier.   
The link between temporality and motive appears most clearly in Modernity and 
Self-identity, a discussion of the way in which the need reflexively to maintain a 
consistent biography which stems from a physical awareness of finite lifespan, comes 
to condition peoples’ perception of, and actions in, the world.  Thus Giddens’ ideas 
come full circle, since social production and reproduction are seen to consist in the 
intended and unintended consequences of the conscious/unconscious interpretive 
activity of myriad agents, as they pursue the logics – the motivations - of their own 
reflexively-maintained biographies, within the enabling and constraining conditions 
of high modernity.   
In this way, although its focus is the conditioning action of ‘social’ structure, the 
underlying logic of Giddens’ theory of structuration may be said to derive from his 
more fundamental view of the motivated self-as-process which underpins his work, 
and from which structuration may not be disconnected as a result.  ‘Stranded’ in 
repeatable time, purely structurational accounts of human interactions lose the hidden 
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urgency, and explanatory narrative, through which they derive their meaning and 
organizational portrayals become literally lifeless: there is no sense of events being 
driven by and occurring within, peoples’ irreversible lives.  Interestingly, this is 
exactly the criticism Giddens directs at Goffman: 
 
…Goffman’s analyses of encounters presume motivated agents rather than 
investigating sources of human motivation, as many of his critics have 
complained.  The lack is a serious one and one of the main reasons…why 
Goffman’s work has something of an ‘empty’ feel to it” (1984:70). 
 
3. Analysis of ‘social’ structure is necessary, but insufficient 
Having emphasised the need to use structuration alongside, rather than separate 
from, Giddens’ wider ideas on human motive, this section discusses his ‘dimensions 
of the duality of structure’ model (Fig.1.) in greater detail.  As a schematic to show 
what its title indicates it was intended by its author to show – dimensions of the 
duality of structure, no more, and no less – Giddens’ model represents a useful 
concept with which to approach both an aspect of his thought, and an aspect of the 
organizational domain.  This is because, although it tells us a lot about the nature of 
social structure, and the way in which this is replicated or subverted through human 
action, Fig.1. tells us comparatively little about human motive, or about any of the 
other rich insights about subjectivity which run throughout Giddens’ thought, from 
which the model ultimately derives its logic, as argued earlier.  It is unsurprising, 
therefore, that Giddens entitles his model ‘the dimensions of the duality of structure’ – 
and not, for example, ‘the emergent condition of subjectivity’, ‘domains of the 
emergence of narrative’, or ‘conscious and unconscious motive in addressing 
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existential anxiety’ – since the model is not intended to address these, equally vital, 
aspects of his thought.  We can say this with some certainty, since the model brackets 
out individual reflexivity to concentrate on social structure:  
 
“Concentration upon the analysis of the structural properties of social systems, 
it should be stressed, is a valid procedure only if it is recognized as placing an 
epoché upon – holding in suspension – reflexively monitored social conduct” 
(1984:30). 
 
Signification Domination Legitimation
Interpretative scheme Facility Norm
SanctionPowerCommunication
structure
(modality)
interaction
 
Fig.1.: Giddens’ dimensions of the duality of structure (1994:29) 
 
‘Structurational’ analysis is therefore useful as a framework with which to study 
the production and reproduction of social structure – but represents an insufficient 
basis for IS researchers seeking to study human-IS interaction in any complete sense – 
since the (for Giddens) equally important, co-ordinating effect of human reflexivity is 
bracketed out.  Put another way, although the Dimensions portray a duality, they 
portray the social structural side of this duality, rather than the biographical, reflexive 
side, of which researchers should continue to be aware: 
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“Reflexive awareness…is characteristic of all human action, and is the specific 
condition of (that) massively developed institutional reflexivity” (1991:35). 
 
However, it is arguable that IS researchers have shown a tendency to make 
exclusive use of Giddens’ Dimensions to interpret human-IS interaction, to the 
exclusion of this wider awareness.  Perhaps the best-known examples of the 
application of structuration theory within the IS context occur in Orlikowski and 
Robey (1991) and Orlikowski (1992).  Offered as a ‘Framework for investigating the 
interaction of human actors and social structure during information systems 
development’ (1991:159), in a way which presupposes some attention to explaining 
the actions of the human actors themselves, Orlikowski and Robey’s structurational 
analysis nonetheless focuses almost exclusively on an observation of the structures 
which may intentionally or unintentionally be created by human action.  In the 
absence of attention in their wider analysis to the complex of ideas surrounding 
emergent subjectivity which underpin Giddens’ pre-1991 work (their article obviously 
predates Modernity and Self-Identity), and bathed in the exclusively structurational 
light of their framework, Orlikowski and Robey’s systems developers appear shorn of 
personal motive, and driven exclusively by organizational structures.  Instead of ‘the 
interaction of human actors and social structure’, Orlikowski and Robey’s analysis 
appears to address just the ‘dimensions of the duality of information systems’ – which 
is, of course, unsurprising given their use of Giddens’ Dimensions of the duality of 
structure as their exclusive analytical framework. 
In turn, this framework formed the groundwork for Orlikowski’s (1992) 
landmark application of structuration theory within an IS case study the following 
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year, which develops a ‘structurational model of technology’.  Although its title 
acknowledges its (social) structural focus, a close look at this model reveals the same 
assumptions about human motivation as was evident in the Orlikowski-Robey article 
of the previous year.  In other words, recalling Giddens’ earlier comment about 
Goffman’s work, Orlikowski’s structurational model of technology presumes 
motivated agents, rather than investigating sources of human motivation within 
structural constraints.  Thus, although technology is seen as both product and medium 
of human action (a valid and important point, deriving directly from Giddens’ 
dimensions of the duality of structure), human action itself is viewed in an almost 
completely unproblematic light – people are ‘agents’, whose actions are influenced by 
both technology and institutions – but not, it seems, by their reflexive perceptions of 
their historical selves in the manner described in the first part of this paper.  As will be 
seen in the next section, actions in Orlikowski’s model occur in repeatable time – at 
the micro-level, and at the macro-level – but are not affected by the critical third, non-
repeatable, temporal dimension, so vital to Giddens’ oeuvre, which factors peoples’ 
reflexive biographies into the analysis. 
Nonetheless, as was the case with Orlikowski and Robey’s ‘framework’, 
Orlikowski’s (1992) ‘structurational model’ is a useful way of conceptualising the 
fluid co-emergence of technology and organizations – together with an appreciation 
of the way in which these may both constrain and enable human actions.  Her 
summary of the structurational model in relation to the case material is very revealing 
about the duality of technology, together with an aspect of the institutional context.  It 
describes the duality of social structure very well: how the consultants’ use of tools is 
influenced by Beta’s institutional context, the way in which the tools mediate 
consultants’ perceptions through interpretive schemes, norms, and resources, and the 
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way in which the use of the tools reaffirms these modalities.  It also describes well 
how deviant actions by the consultants, “if sufficiently vigorous and sustained” 
(1992:420) may induce managers to authorise alterations to the design of the tools to 
include more flexibility, thus altering Beta’s institutional context. 
As a description of the operation of social structure within information systems, 
Orlikowski’s study is undoubtedly a landmark contribution within interpretive IS.  
However, statements such as “for these researchers, structuration offers a solution to 
the dilemma of choosing between subjective and objective conceptions of 
organizations, and allows them to embrace both” (1992:403) are misleading, since in 
fact what is being offered is an account of social structure only: intersubjectively 
convergent social/cultural understandings (the sense in which “structure” is used in 
Giddens’ Dimensions at Fig.1. – e.g. Giddens, 1984:185), uncoloured by the 
biographically-derived motives of the person doing the understanding. 
Indeed, despite Giddens’ emphasis on the importance of unconscious/conscious 
sources of motivation in biographical, hence irreversible, time in explaining social 
action, and of other, periodical ‘bow shots’ from commentators such as Knights and 
Willmott (1989), and Boland (1993), accounts of motivation are almost entirely 
absent from the majority of IS and organizational studies which seek to apply 
Giddens’ ideas (see Jones, 1999, and Jones and Karsten, 2003, for a useful review).  
This is particularly evident within the IS literature, where ‘adaptive structuration 
theory’ and the ‘structurational model of technology’ have arguably pursued a 
relentless transformation of the structurational model into the mechanical 
approximation of ‘technology=structure’, vs ‘organizational actors = agency’ leaving 
the dynamic stripped almost entirely of supporting theoretical context – and, in 
particular, stranded in reversible time (e.g. Orlikowski, 1992; Jones and 
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Nandhakumar, 1993; DeSanctis and Poole; 1994, Rose, 1999; Maznevski and 
Chudoba ,2000). 
A somewhat rare exception in the literature is the type of study which seeks to 
apply Giddens’ ideas in a ‘meta-theoretical’ (Jones, 1999) manner, thus arguably 
avoiding the need to uproot the structurational dynamic from the more ‘subjective’ 
aspect of Giddens’ writings and transfer it into another context.  Two examples will 
be mentioned here.  In the first, Hayes and Walsham (1999) examine the very 
different experiences of computer hardware engineers in their use of a laptop-based 
work co-ordination system for travelling repair agents.  Summarising three of these, 
Walsham notes: 
 
“What is immediately striking about these stories is the radically different 
conceptualisations of the nature of their job, their own identity, including their 
work identity, and the role and perceived value of IT systems in their work life” 
(2001:73). 
 
The role of peoples’ identities in conditioning peoples’ reactions to, and manner 
of using, the IS appears clearly from this study.  In the second, Barrett and Walsham 
(1999) make an innovative attempt to interpret the impact of the introduction of new 
electronic trading systems into the London insurance market using a more rounded set 
of Giddens’ ideas.  In so doing, Barrett and Walsham succeed in preserving the 
anchoring of these ideas to individual motivation and meaning - which I have argued 
is so important - through an explicit treatment of the emergent co-evolution of traders’ 
self-identities and wider organizational structure, although they do not adopt the sort 
of explicit focus on the conditioning effects of narrative structure developed below.  
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However, the study appears to succeed in achieving the opposite of Giddens’ criticism 
of Goffman: it has a ‘full feel’ to it, grounded as it is in an intuitively plausible 
account of human motivation.  The remainder of this paper constitutes an attempt to 
build on this foundation. 
 
4. Dimensions of the duality of Self: a complementary focus 
Fig.2. shows Giddens’ Dimensions, with an additional, ‘biographical’ realm of 
interaction added below, indicating that social interaction draws upon a 
biographically, as well as merely socially conditioned, realm of structure.  It should be 
emphasised immediately at this point that in introducing this modification to Giddens’ 
diagram, the intention is merely to draw IS researchers’ attention to aspects of his 
wider work regarding human subjectivity which the structurational model, in placing 
an epoché upon biographical reflexivity, was not intended to illustrate.  The additional 
terms in Fig.2. are thus intended to be used alongside Giddens’ Dimensions only in a 
temporary sense, to illustrate the importance of his wider considerations of such 
biographical reflexivity in complementing the structurational model as an explanation 
of social life.  Although, as shown earlier, such considerations are germane to all his 
work, the additional terms used in Fig.2. come from Modernity and Self-Identity 
(1991), in which Giddens addresses the issue of biographical reflexivity in detail.   
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Interpretative scheme Facility Norm
`SanctionPowerCommunication
structure
(modality)
interaction
Presentation of Self Self-Identity
Bodily disciplineRoutinised attitudes
(modality)
structure Autobiography
‘Social’
realm
‘Biographical’
realm
Discursive/practical/
(un) consciousness
 
Fig.2.: Dimensions of the dualities of social and biographical structure 
 
In Giddens’ words, “analysing the structuration of social systems means 
studying the modes in which such systems, grounded in the knowledgeable activities 
of situated actors who draw upon rules and resources in the diversity of action 
contexts, are produced and reproduced in interaction” (1984:25).  Thus, 
structurational analysis involves examining how, in the process of communication, 
people draw pragmatically upon interpretive schemes to produce and reproduce 
structures of signification; how they express particular, situated relations of power in 
interaction by drawing on allocative facilities which both produce and reproduce 
structures of domination; and how they morally sanction, or justify, these relations by 
drawing upon social norms which both produce and reproduce structures of 
legitimation - and how these three dimensions are fused in the instant of activity, 
since “structures of signification are separable only analytically either from 
domination and from legitimation” (1984:33).  As stated earlier, such structures are all 
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social in nature: “rules and resources, or sets of transformation relations, organized as 
properties of social systems” (1984:25).  Below, I explain how IS researchers using 
the structurational model may wish to consider the reflexive production and 
reproduction of biographical structures in social interaction. 
Just as (social) “structure has no existence independent of the knowledge that 
agents have about what they do in their day-to-day activity” (1994:26), so “the self is 
seen as a reflexive project…dependent on the reconstructive endeavours in which he 
or she engages” (1991:75) i.e. both concepts are non-substantive, and emergent in 
human (inter)action.  Just as in Giddens’ attempt, in structuration, to deconstruct 
social structure into three dimensions (his three columns in Fig.1.), he advises that 
when discussing the self “rather than talking in general terms of ‘individual’, ‘self’ or 
even ‘self-identity’…we should try to break things down into finer detail” (1991:75).  
Just, also, as it is necessary to bracket out biographical considerations from 
structuration in order to study the operation of social structure, so in Modernity and 
Self-Identity Giddens temporarily brackets out social structure when discussing the 
trajectory of the self.  Thus it is argued that IS researchers seeking to make use of 
structuration risk applying an incomplete – and therefore misleading - theoretical 
framework unless they ensure that this is balanced by a consideration of Giddens’ 
equal concerns regarding biographical motivation.   
Turning to Fig.2. in detail, within the dimension of legitimation, people draw 
upon normative values to justify, or legitimate, their actions, and in so doing create 
and recreate social structures of legitimation.  However, as in the case of the other two 
dimensions of Giddens’ structurational model, although this tells us about the way in 
which social structure is produced and reproduced, it tells us little about the 
conditioning effects of individual reflexivity which temper this process – which are 
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bracketed out.  For underlying peoples’ actions in drawing on social norms to appeal 
to ‘moral’ structures of legitimation is a desire to fulfil another, irreducibly personal, 
morality: “The morality of authenticity (which) skirts any universal moral criteria” 
(1991:79), and is “based on ‘being true to oneself’” (1991:78).  As indicated in the 
first part of the paper, it is arguably this desire to enact a coherent personal narrative 
within the “reflexively actualised trajectory of self-actualisation” (1991:79)  - i.e. as 
understood by a person at any one particular moment - which forms the driving 
motor, or logic, co-ordinating their actions in relation to the social structures with 
which they are confronted. 
In this way, “The autobiography is a corrective intervention into the past” 
(1991:72), since it is reflexively produced and reproduced in response to the way in 
which people perceive themselves; indeed, “Reconstruction of the past goes along 
with anticipation of the likely life trajectory of the future” (1991:72).  Thus “It is 
made clear that self-identity, as a coherent phenomenon, presumes a narrative” 
(1991:76).  In their continuous generation of self-identity, or ‘self-actualisation’, - a 
particular, unifying conception of themselves at any one moment – people thus draw 
upon and revise a deeper, narrative ‘biographical’ structure which extends reflexively 
into both past and future. 
At any moment, therefore, a person has a sense both of social norms, and of 
their own particular temporary positioning within such norms (self identity) – and one 
cannot be experienced independently of the other.  Just as social structures of 
legitimation form a referential framework within which social norms at any one 
moment can ‘exist’, so, biographical structures of autobiography also form a 
referential framework within which an equally temporary self-identity can ‘exist’.  It 
therefore makes as little sense to consider emergent social norms without the vantage 
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point of emergent self-identity from which they must be viewed, as to consider 
emergent self-identity in isolation from the emergent social norms in which it must be 
located. 
Within the dimension of domination in Fig.2, people draw upon allocative 
facilities available to them, and in so doing create or reproduce wider power structures 
at the social level.  However, the way in which this occurs is likely to be conditioned, 
not just through the action of structural constraints on their discursive/non-discursive 
awareness, but at the phenomenological level of practical consciousness, which “is 
integral to the reflexive monitoring of action” (1991:36).  Expressed as tacit, 
embodied skill (e.g. Polanyi, 1958; Nonaka, 1991), practical consciousness has, of 
course, formed a core element of the recent interest in knowledge management (e.g. 
Blackler, 1995; McDermott, 1999).  However, Giddens adopts a more political 
emphasis, citing Merleau-Ponty and Goffman’s contention that  
 
“Bodily discipline is intrinsic to the competent social agent…and it is a 
continuous feature of the flow of conduct in the durée of daily life.  Most 
importantly, routine control of the body is integral to the very nature both of 
agency and of being accepted (trusted) by others as competent” (1991:57). 
 
From this it follows that social agency is conditioned not just by the way in 
which people exploit ready-at-hand allocative facilities, rooted in social structures of 
domination, but also by the nature of reflexive, embodied awareness which each 
individual brings to, and with which they interpret, their every social encounter.  
Although not cited by Giddens, it is arguable that Bourdieu’s description of ‘hexis’, 
below, most accurately describes such embodied awareness: 
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“Bodily hexis is political mythology realised, em-bodied, turned into a 
permanent disposition, a durable manner of standing, speaking and thereby of 
feeling and thinking . The principles em-bodied in this way are placed beyond 
the grasp of consciousness” (Bourdieu, 1977:93-4). 
 
In this view, the extent to which individuals’ actions are conditioned by (social) 
structures of domination through the modes of facilities is thus always tempered, or 
conditioned, by the extent of the individual’s discursive, practical, or even 
unconscious level of absorption or resistance to such facilities – which is rooted, in 
turn, in the disposition of the embodied self.  Just as social structures of domination 
can emerge replicated or altered as a result of a social encounter, so, too, can the 
individual’s embodied receptiveness to the operation of power within future 
encounters: Bourdieu’s “durable manner of standing, speaking and thereby of feeling 
and thinking”.  Within the dimension of domination, it therefore makes little sense to 
consider the (structurational) operation of power via facilities, rooted in social 
structures of domination, in the absence of the conditioning effect on such power of 
individuals’ levels of consciousness, and even acceptance, of such facilities, in which 
bodily discipline at both conscious and unconscious levels is both conditioning and 
resulting structure.   
Within the dimension of signification, actors draw upon interpretive schemes 
which are readily available to them within a particular interaction, and in doing so 
reproduce or perhaps alter underlying structures of signification at the social level.  
Although, however, the interpretive schemes available to individuals engaged in the 
act of communication may be constrained by social structures of signification, 
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Giddens argues that such individuals remain able to exercise a degree of choice over 
which schemes to use: 
 
“All individuals actively, although by no means always in a conscious way, 
selectively incorporate many elements of mediated experience into their day-to-
day conduct” (1991:188). 
 
The various acts of communication which may characterise any social encounter 
therefore represent individuals’ own situated responses to the choices and dilemmas 
posed by “living in the world” (1991:188) of mediated information: of available 
interpretive schemes.  By choosing some over others, individuals are affirming a 
position in relation to such schemes (and the social structures by which they are 
enabled and constrained), and thus defining themselves in relation to these.  Thus 
communication is literally an act of self-presentation – i.e. the offering up of a stance 
towards society and its structures: 
 
“As the individual leaves one encounter and enters another, he sensitively 
adjusts the ‘presentation of self’ in relation to whatever is demanded of a 
particular situation” (1991:190). 
 
In otherwords, the communicative stance adopted by an individual in a social 
encounter is constrained not only by ready-to-hand interpretive schemes, but also by 
the presentation of self, or assumed identity, that the individual offers ‘the other’ as a 
response to the particular social (structural) configuration within that encounter.  
 22 
Finally, an individual will form a socially appropriate ‘self’ from the more structural, 
personal vocabulary of routinised attitudes (1991:188) associated with the avoidance 
of ontological anxiety.  In this way, it has been argued that people enact routinised 
scripts (Schank and Abelson, 1977) in relation to their individual perceptions of their 
unique perceived ‘position’ within social structures.  Like all structure, such 
routinised attitudes can constrain, as well as be altered in turn by, social interaction. 
To summarise the discussion of Fig.2, it is proposed that Giddens’ ideas 
concerning social structure, contained within his structurational model, are 
complemented by a further set of his ideas concerning personal, biographical 
structure, which act to constrain the operation of social structure at every turn.  On the 
one hand, there is, indeed, a duality between fleeting social interaction and relatively 
enduring shared social structures, which generates appropriate mental ‘modalities’ 
that are approximately shared by social interactants, and which thus come to condition 
their interaction.  On the other hand, Fig. 2 shows a mirrored duality - between the 
same fleeting social interaction, and relatively enduring non-shared, personal 
structures, which generates its own appropriate modalities, which also come to 
condition the way in which people interact.  For social researchers, the implication is 
that a compelling account of social interaction is likely to comprise an analysis not 
just of the structuration of social systems, but also of the structuration of personal, or 
biographical, systems – equally acknowledged by Giddens in his work, but never 
developed into a dimensions model.  Fig. 2 represents an attempt to begin to 
conceptualise how such a ‘balanced’ model might operate. 
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5. The importance of the ‘biographical’ realm: a personal experience 
In order to illustrate why I believe a balanced account of social interaction 
should incorporate such an analysis of the biographical, as well as the social, realm, I 
offer an account of my own experience between 1990-1994 as an IS consultant 
working for Andersen Consulting, the organization widely believed to be Alpha, the 
large systems integrator described by Orlikowski in her landmark paper discussed 
earlier – using the Method/1 toolset that many believe she is describing.  Regardless 
of Alpha’s real identity, however, it is arguable that the organizational environments – 
and toolsets - which appear within both Orlikowski’s study and these recollections are 
broadly representative of the approach of major systems integrators in the early 
1990s.  On the ‘social structural’ side, my own experience with these tools supports 
her structurational analysis of their conditioning effects: deployed on my first client 
assignment following five weeks’ induction training on the use of these tools, and as a 
raw graduate with no prior business experience, my ability to learn the discipline 
required to remain within the constraints of the tools formed a large factor in my first 
evaluations.  For junior staff, therefore, systems development work was “mediated by 
the assumptions and rules built into the tools” (Orlikowski, 1992:415), which thus 
contributed to “Beta’s structure of domination” (1992:417) in just the way predicted 
by Orlikowski, since Method/1 occupied the entire discursive space; it simply would 
not have occurred to new staff that there might be any other way to operate on a client 
project.  Method/1 indeed had “low interpretive flexibility” (1992:419), and we 
exhibited a “‘trained incapacity’ to do systems development work in any other way” 
(1992:420). 
In her discussion of her (for me, as an ex-employee, remarkably accurate) 
findings, Orlikowski comments that  
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“…there is flexibility in how people design, interpret, and use technology, but 
(that) this flexibility is a function of the material components comprising the 
artifact, the institutional context in which technology is developed and used, and 
the power, knowledge, and interests of human actors (developers, users, and 
managers)” (1992:421). 
 
However, although Orlikowski’s use of Giddens’ Dimensions of the duality of 
structure allows her to address the institutional and material components of Beta’s 
systems development projects in a revealing way, it is arguable, following the 
discussion thus far, that her resulting view of “human actors” in terms solely of their 
organizational ‘roles’ as “developers, users, and managers” leads to an 
underestimation of those other influences at work which are bracketed out of 
Giddens’ structurational model.  Thus her structurational analysis of human agency 
(already short at less than a page of a total of over 25), can conceive of people voicing 
opposition to the tools only in terms of their job – e.g. when “perceiving this as 
unnecessarily time-consuming”, or wanting to assume more “control over their task 
execution” (1992:419).  Whilst, again, my own experience confirms this as a useful 
observation, it would also indicate that such an analysis of the human-technology 
relationship is incomplete.  In the manner suggested by the analysis of Giddens’ work 
on biographical motive in the first part of the paper, and in terms of the analytical 
extension of Giddens’ Dimensions into the subjective realm in the second part of the 
paper, I can confirm that my own organizational experience was affected by other 
equally (and, to me at the time, more) important modalities – which I discuss below in 
terms of the three dimensions shown in Fig.2. 
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Within the dimension of legitimation, my own use of the tools was certainly 
conditioned by institutional structures as Orlikowski describes, and can thus be seen 
as reproducing “a set of norms about what is and what is not acceptable 
“professional” social practice” (Orlikowski, 1992:418).  However, our organizational 
behaviour was conditioned equally by factors within the biographical realm: as fresh-
faced 21 year-olds, I and several of my peers were equally beset by doubts of a 
reflexive nature about whether we had made an appropriate decision in joining an 
organization which appeared upon closer inspection to have designed out 
opportunitieas for initiative – of which Method/1 is a good example.  My own self-
identity at the time, the standard against which my desire for self-authenticity was 
expressed and measured, indicated that I might indeed have taken a wrong decision, 
defined in Giddens’ terms of being “true to oneself”.  My continued reproduction of 
this identity was based on an autobiography which included a humanities background 
at odds with the strongly engineering-based organizational culture, a broad interest 
base which appeared incompatible with the long hours and exclusive work orientation 
of the company, and a value set which placed the ability to live at home and pursue a 
regular social life above a more itinerant, client-based lifestyle over which we had 
little control. 
The result, for me, of this apparent contradiction between my perceptions of the 
structures of legitimation and norms within Andersen Consulting and my own, 
biographically-derived, reflexive self-identity as I perceived it at the time, was a lack 
of commitment to the organizational values of the company as enshrined within 
Method/1, to which my desire for authenticity could not allow me to sanction a full 
personal endorsement – and, as I was informed by my superiors on more than one 
occasion, a low productivity and accuracy in terms of completed deliverables.  Whilst, 
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therefore, my reflexively derived psychological state at the time – borne of an 
experienced incompatibility between the ‘social’ and ‘biographical’ realms shown in 
Fig.2. - was undoubtedly my own problem to address, there is little doubt in my mind 
either of its existence as an issue with which I had to deal, or of its material 
consequences for Andersen Consulting – which eventually included my decision to 
leave the organization four years later.  Nor was this a unique situation within my peer 
group: several close colleagues were experiencing similar difficulties in reconciling 
the interaction between social and biographical structure in their working lives.  It is 
interesting that it appears that the company’s present incarnation – Accenture – retains 
a relatively high staff turnover (Vault Guide, 2002); arguably a result, at least in part, 
of such comparative organizational inflexibility.   
Within the dimension of domination, my ‘effective and efficient’ use of 
Method/1 was constrained not just, for example, in the way in which the interface’s 
design conditioned my available ways of thinking about systems development (the 
structurational approach), but also through a combination of my physical and mental 
subjectivity – incorporating not just the current state of compromise between the 
demands of my organizational self and my wider self-identity – addressed in the 
previous dimension - but also physical self-consciousness (for example, upon my first 
client assignment, I felt acutely awkward in my only - cheap and ill-fitting – suit, 
which drew comments from several colleagues).  This also included a less articulable, 
physically experienced desire to escape at intervals from the (to me) stifling gaze of 
my superiors, in a work environment where long hours were viewed as a sign of 
commitment, and expectations of unbroken physical presence, or ‘overtime’ formed a 
ready source of organizational control. 
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My response to organizational structures of domination is thus not explainable 
solely in terms of the allocative facilities upon which I was able to draw (the 
structurational approach), but recalls, again, Bourdieu’s “durable manner of standing, 
speaking and thereby of feeling and thinking”.  An emphasis upon protracted physical 
presence – first in the long hours at client sites and then later in corporate hotels for 
dinner, dressing in a certain manner, sitting at a certain desk with ‘junior’ analysts - 
even upon the use of certain mannerisms – helped, in my case, to perpetuate a 
particular bodily discipline, mediated by a demoralized mode of consciousness.  I 
have little doubt that such a physical and mental ‘state of mind’ contributed to my low 
effectiveness in using the tools that Orlikowski describes; in otherwords, the 
technology was rendered less effective as a result of the conditioning action of the 
biographical realm. 
Within the dimension of signification, my presentation of self within the 
organizational context was not simply a matter of acquiescence to “resources which 
are deployed in order to control the work of consultants” (Orlikowski, 1992:417), 
although this undoubtedly played a role.  In addition, I suggest that such presentation 
was a mask behind which I attempted to hide my overall self-identity as a ‘non-
Andersens person’, though the deployment of routinised behavioural ‘scripts’ 
appropriate to the role of junior consultant on such projects.  In turn, my temporary 
following of such scripts as a ready-made set of attitudes and activities enabled a 
certain cynical suspension of the sort of underlying ontological anxiety which resulted 
from my growing awareness that I was perhaps doing the ‘wrong’ job. 
Finally, of course, as new employees, it was acknowledged on the projects on 
which we worked that our effectiveness with the Method/1 toolset would increase 
over time, as we learned at a sub-conscious, tacit level to operate the function-key 
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strokes and routines which enabled more experienced consultants to work more 
quickly and effectively.  As mentioned earlier, such tacit knowledge, resident in the 
embodied selves which we brought to the keyboard, represents a further way in which 
our interpretive schemes of the structures of signification within the software were 
moderated by a more embodied reflexivity. 
The intention in retailing a set of such uncomfortable biographical details is to 
show, in the only unequivocal way available to me – my own experience - the 
limitations of a purely structurational approach to explaining human-IS interaction, 
which would have been incapable of any of the above considerations.  As a result, I 
have little doubt that the way in which people deal reflexively with their own unique 
set of biographical contradictions – and, in turn, reconcile these with the demands of 
‘social’ structure - is as important as social structure per se in conditioning such 
interaction.  I know that in the case of Method/1, the perceived authority of the 
technology within many client projects was directly threatened at one point by an 
interesting (if unauthorised) release entitled ‘Resign/1!’ – a software routine which 
allowed the user to “type a standard resignation letter and fax it to head office without 
leaving your seat”.  However, like Orlikowski’s unauthorised screen example, this 
particular circumvention of Andersen’s structural modalities enjoyed a particularly 
short lifespan before being removed by ‘structures of domination’. 
 
6. Conclusion 
I do not mean to portray an unequivocally negative picture of my early 
experience at my first employer, which provided an, often efficient, working 
environment to which many people found themselves well suited – as well, in my 
own case, as an invaluable training.  However, the point emerges that, although the 
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modalities of signification, domination, and legitimation were substantially the same 
for all employees across the organization, Andersen Consulting experienced 
considerably different patterns of behaviour – and varied effectiveness in use of its 
toolsets - amongst its employees, variance of some considerable importance to the 
organization which remains substantially unaddressed within a structurational 
framework. 
The first and second parts of this paper thus argued, from a theoretical 
perspective, that the way in which social structure is always interpreted by, and 
moderated through, biographical narrative forms a core theme of Giddens’ work – and 
that, although this theme is not directly addressed within his Dimensions of the duality 
of structure, analysts wishing to make use of structuration to address the dynamics of 
power within organizations should thus consider complementing their framework 
with a discussion of the sorts of biographical contradictions which employees may be 
experiencing.  Yet the practical need to understand more about the sort of marked 
variance in employee behaviour noted in the third part of this paper constitutes 
possibly the most compelling reason for IS researchers to ensure that they address 
both the ‘social’ and ‘biographical’ aspects, or polarities, of structure.  In Alvesson 
and Willmott’s words: 
 
“The potency and influence of the media of regulation is always conditional 
upon organizational members’ responses to them.  Discourses may be 
comparatively familiar and readily interpreted within an on-going identity 
narrative and associated emotional condition; or they may be disruptive of 
it…People may distance themselves from the company as a key source of 
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identification and draw upon the occupation, subunit or non-work sources of 
self-definition (“I am a family man rather than a career person”)” (2002:27). 
 
At the practical level it is arguable that IS researchers seeking to complement 
their structurational analyses with a consideration of the possible workings of such 
‘biographical structure’ need not be daunted by the non-material nature of the 
dimensions of the biographical domain, which are no less concrete than the ‘memory 
traces’ of Giddens’ Dimensions of the duality of structure.  Analyses of both ‘social’ 
and ‘biographical’ structural domains can only ever seek to make speculative 
observations regarding the possible intersubjective interactions underlying observable 
phenomena, since both are explanatory theoretical frameworks, rather than 
‘mappable’ analytical grids.   
Since ‘true’ objectivity is not possible within an interpretive context, it is thus 
arguable that studies which seek explicitly to include subjective accounts of 
motivation, or biographical structure, are no more open to concerns regarding 
‘authenticity’ than studies which seek to include equally subjective accounts of the 
operation of social structure.  Both accounts are typically retrospective interpretations 
on the part of the research subject, and furthermore are offered ‘second hand’ through 
the further interpretive layer of the researcher.  Indeed, by removing this second 
interpretive layer altogether, it is arguable that accounts such as the above 
‘confession’ offer the reader greater, not less, authenticity. 
The theoretical framework proposed in this paper is especially amenable to 
being used by researchers in an autobiographical, or ‘confessional’ sense (van 
Maanen 1988), in a similar manner to that employed in the previous section.  
However, it could also be used within the more traditional context of the 
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researcher/research subject.  Whilst, of course, it may be true that research subjects 
may be reluctant to wear their hearts on their sleeves – to disclose underlying 
motivations – to a researcher of merely passing acquaintance, my own organizational 
experience suggests that many people are willing – even keen – to talk about 
themselves within a research situation once a degree of trust has been established, 
especially within a more sustained research setting of ethnographic involvement.  
Since visible social structures are considered an acceptable basis for structurational 
analysis - even though they can never be more than an approximation to the memory 
traces in which they reflexively exist in the minds of research subjects - so, too, such 
subjects’ disclosures about themselves should be considered an acceptable – if 
necessarily approximate – basis for a complementary analysis of the biographical 
motivations by which social structures may be conditioned. 
Finally, it should be emphasised that the organization of Giddens’ wider ideas 
concerning motive into the dimensions in Fig.2. is not intended in any normative 
sense as a definitive framework; had Giddens himself intended such a framework to 
balance his structurational model, he might surely have provided us with one.  
However, in as much as Giddens’ ideas are applied in a variety of ways to illuminate 
social issues within various disciplines, without making normative claims about his 
original intentions (as Orlikowski notes in her 1992 paper, structuration itself was not 
designed with IS researchers in mind), the Dimensions of the duality of Self in Fig.2. 
is intended primarily as a way of illustrating that the interrelationships between 
several of his key ideas concerning biographical motivation deserve greater attention 
within the IS canon – particularly by those who seek to apply his structurational 
model, which Fig.2. shows such ideas to complement.  In this vein, the short 
confessional in this paper is intended as a talking piece which it is hoped may 
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contribute further to the ongoing debate about the application of Giddens’ ideas 
within the organizational and IS fields. 
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